

Conventional Implicatures in Ukrainian Discourse

Liliia Bezugla

Department of German Philology and Translation, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Kharkiv, Ukraine

Nataliia Govorukha

Department of German Philology and Translation, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Kharkiv, Ukraine

Sergiy Kryvoruchko

Department of German Philology and Translation, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Kharkiv, Ukraine

Olesya Malaya

Department of German Philology and Translation, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Kharkiv, Ukraine

Abstract—The present study aims at the analysis of conventional implicatures (Grice, 1991) actualized in Ukrainian dialogical discourse. The distinction between conventional and conversational implicatures is described. We argue that what is commonly considered conventional implicature is in fact implicature only in discourse. Implicatures are inherently conversational because they are intended by the speaker and derived by the addressee in discourse. Therefore, it makes sense to regard conventional implicatures as such that are actualized not only in discursive context (such being the case with conversational implicatures), but by certain language means in virtue of their semantics. They serve as triggers allowing the addressee to derive implicature through its conventional meaning. Implicature triggers are culture-specific, since their semantics is determined by conventions of a particular natural language. Depending on language status of the trigger, conventional implicatures are divided into lexical, paroemic and syntactic.

Index Terms—conventional implicatures, conversational implicature, dialogical discourse, implicature trigger

I. INTRODUCTION

Grice's theory of implicature primarily deals with conversational implicature. Although he sets it against conventional implicature, it is often stressed that "the difference between them is not always clear-cut in particular cases" (Lyons, 1979, p. 593). According to Grice, implicature is considered conventional when "the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated" (Grice, 1991, p. 25), otherwise conversational implicature is the case "as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse" (p. 26), characterized by the Cooperative Principle and specific conversational maxims.

Grice's vague style of presenting his theory has led to misreading of conventional implicature. Levinson (2001, p. 140) claims that it is often confused with presupposition, implication and inference, as it derives from the conventional meaning of words and grammar structures. Bach (1999) showed that there is no such thing as conventional implicature at all, in fact, it is a myth, because the phenomena that have been described do not contribute to what is implicated.

The features of conversational implicature were analyzed, suggested by Grice (1991, p. 39 f.) – cancelability, nondetachability, nonconventionality, truth value, calculability, the list was expanded by universality (Levinson, 2001, p. 132) and dependence on the context or variability (Meibauer, 2001, p. 38). Relying on researchers' opinions (Liedtke, 1995, p. 29 f.; Levinson, 2000, p. 130; Rolf, 2013, p. 95 f.), we consider none of these features a solid distinguishing criterion of conversational and conventional implicatures. Gricean theory was developed based on discourse, so logical and semantic criteria can hardly be valid in it. Discourse should be approached with linguistic criteria.

In section II of this article we conduct a critical analysis of the common classification of implicatures. We argue that linguistic study should use a linguistic criterion to distinguish conventional and conversational implicatures instead of logical and semantic ones, i.e. relation to the conventional meaning of language units.

If the conventional implicature conveyed by a speaker derives from the conventional meaning of a particular language device – word or syntactic structure of the utterance used to convey it, it is considered conventional. In discourse, such language devices serve as triggers of implicature. It is the language triggers that allow deriving conventional implicature out of discursive context as well. If the utterance misses such triggers and the implicature is only derived based on discursive context, it is qualified as conversational.

Both types are intended – they are conveyed due to speaker's perlocutionary goal. If the implicature is not intended, it cannot be called an implicature, and should be considered as listener's inferences regarding speaker's language behavior.

Analysis of specific discourse excerpts instead of artificially composed examples enables distinguishing culture-bound types of conventional implicatures, given their relation to units of a particular language – lexical, paroemiatic and syntactic ones (section III of this article).

The illustrative examples were taken from Ukrainian plays from the 2nd half of the 20th century, whose character speech has close resemblance to colloquial language.

II. PROBLEMS OF CLASSIFYING IMPLICATURES

The types of implicatures described by Grice are presented in classifications by different scholars (e.g. Levinson, 2001, p. 144; Meggle, 1993, p. 505; Rolf, 1994, p. 124; Rolf, 2013, p. 97 f.) – see Figure 1.




Figure 1 Types of Implicatures by Rolf (1994)

First, implicatures are divided by the criterion of conventionality into conventional and nonconventional. Conventionality is understood to be the accordance of words and expressions with the meaning assigned to them per convention in the language community.

Nonconventional implicatures are divided into conversational and nonconversational. While conversational implicatures are calculated based on the Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims, nonconversational implicatures use other maxims – “aesthetic, social or moral in character” (Grice, 1991, p. 28). For example, judging from speaker’s language behavior – verbal utterances and nonverbal signals – addressee or third party can deduce inferences about speaker’s occupation, social status, education, mood, character etc.

According to Grice, conversational implicatures are entirely dependent on the context. Out of the context, they seem impossible to be derived, since they are not conventionally bound to words’ meanings (feature of nonconventionality), are not necessary for the truth of the sentence (truth value) and inseparable from the utterance (nondetachability). In the context, they are calculated by the speaker in the course of a derivation sequence (calculability), although the speaker may dismiss them (cancelability).

There are two types of conversational implicatures – generalized and particularized. As a basis, Levinson (2001, p. 138) takes the criterion of dependency on the context, while Rolf (1994, p. 128 f.) takes the criterion of intending. Particularized implicatures are always intended; they are speaker implicatures, implicatures in the strong sense, as they are conveyed intentionally and fully depend on the context, as opposed to generalized implicatures, which Rolf calls implicatures in the weak sense, or utterance implicatures. In terms of Gazdar (1979, p. 35), they are respectively actual and potential implicatures. A potential (generalized) implicature can come as an actual (particularized) one provided that it is intended by the speaker.

Generalized implicatures are divided into scalar and clausal. The former arise from scalar meaning of lexical units, the latter – from the whole sentence.

This classification raises a range of discussion reflections which we would like to summarize as follows.

First, there is a problematic issue that conventional implicatures derived from the meanings of particular expressions belong to what is implicated and not to what is said. This raises a question: are they implicatures? Grice defined only conversational implicatures and warned: “The nature of conventional implicature needs to be examined before any free use of it, for explanatory purposes, can be indulged in” (Grice, 1991, p. 46). Bach (1999) gives a negative answer to this question: “If there are conventional implicatures, they must be conventional and they must be implicatures” (p. 329); “When we do examine it, we find that there are no clear examples of it” (p. 365).

Bach analyzed a set of cases that were called presupposition (Karttunen & Peters, 1979, p. 11), but are in fact instances of conventional implicature: adverbs like *only*, *too*, connectives like *but*, *so*, implicative verbs like *continue*, *manage*, subordinating conjunctions like *although*, *even though*, and content modifiers like *therefore* and *surprisingly*, and concluded that utterances that include them do not generate implicatures. He wrote:

The phenomena that have been thought to be conventional implicatures turn out to be examples of something else. In some cases, the propositions that are alleged to be conventional implicatures are actually aspects of what is said. <...> In other cases, the expressions in question are utterance modifiers. They do not contribute to what is said, but they do not generate conventional implicatures either – they are vehicles for the performance of second-order speech acts (Bach, 1999, p. 365).

When the implicit meanings of this type are aspects of what is said, they cannot be named implicatures.

Second, the phenomena called nonconversational implicatures in this classification also draw objections. In fact, nonconversational calculations are not implicatures but inferences, as they are not intended by the speaker.

The notion of intending is the basis of the theory of implicature. Hence the type of conclusions called implicatures has a certain feature of intendability (Levinson, 2001, p. 111), i.e. all implicatures are intended. Grice defines implicature as follows:

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that *p* has implicated that *q*, may be said to have conversationally implicated that *q*, provided that (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, *q* is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say *p* (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required (Grice, 1991, p. 30 f.).

Although Grice does not use the term ‘intention’ in this definition, he obviously means an intentional conveyance of the implicature from speaker to addressee.

Intention is a notion from cognitive psychology, in the subject’s psyche it is viewed as his focusing on the state of affairs in the external world. According to Searle (1993), there is a distinction between: a) the first order intention, intention to present, or representing intention, which represents, how mental states are directed at objects and states of affairs in the world; b) the second order intention, intention to communicate, or communication intention, the speaker’s wish to render his representing intention to the addressee and trigger a certain reaction, i.e. perform a speech act (p. 165 f.).

The second level of intention involves the subject’s illocutionary and perlocutionary goals. By pursuing these goals the subject becomes a speaker.

When a speaker wants to convey an implicature, his communicative intention includes a perlocutionary goal of affecting an addressee in such a way that the latter would derive an implicature, which is the intending of an implicature by the speaker. This justifies Seyfert’s opinion (1978, p. 181) that conversational implicatures belong to the sphere of perlocution.

Third, it is generally recognized, that the distinction between conventional and generalized implicatures has not been plausibly clarified. Both types depend on the meaning of a lexical item expression. Grice himself admits the weakness of the generalized implicatures concept: “Noncontroversial examples are perhaps hard to find, since it is all too easy to treat a generalized conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature” (Grice, 1991, p. 56).

Most certainly, Grice meant intending essence of generalized implicatures and nonintending of conventional ones. However, he did not consider the fact that the same generalized implicature can be nonintended and intended in discourse, since as noted above, he considered all implicatures intended. From this perspective, distinguishing actual and potential conversational implicatures loses its point.

Forth, the classification is based on three criteria – conventionality, conversationality and intendability. The fact that implicatures can be nonconversational and nonintended actually means that this classification equates them with inferences. This is not a classification of implicatures, but of inferences and implications. Nevertheless, those traditional logical semantic terms were unsatisfactory to Grice, so he brought in new ones:

I wish to introduce, as terms of art, the verb *implicate* and the related nouns *implicature* (cf. *implying*) and *implicatum* (cf. *what is implied*). The point of this maneuver is to avoid having, on each occasion to choose between this or that member of the family of verbs for which *implicate* is to do general duty (Grice, 1991, p. 24).

The term “implicature” is Grice’s invention to define implicit meanings that emerge in discourse based on speaker’s intention. Its difference from corresponding logical terms lies above all in the fact that it is intended and exists only in discourse. New terms are the link between two Gricean theories – theory of implicature and theory of nonnatural meaning (meaning_{NN}): meaning_{NN} (nonnatural or utterer’s meaning – *what is meant*) consists of literal meaning (*what is said*) and implicature (*what is implicated*) (Grice, 1991, p. 118). Thus, meaning_{NN} conveys more than the actual words. It depends on the speaker’s intentions: “‘A meant_{NN} something by x’ is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention’” (Grice, 1991, p. 221).

The implicatures are called implicatures, because they are implicated, i.e. intended by the speaker and derived by the addressee (cf.: Davis, 2003, p. 121; Lyons, 1979, 2, p. 592; Levinson, 2001, p. 111).

Both conversational and conventional implicatures are intended. Both are actualized in discourse and depend on a discursive context (to a greater or a lesser extent). The term “actualization” is understood here as transition from language into speech as explained by Bally (1965, p. 82): “l’actualisation a pour fonction de faire passer la langue dans la parole”.

The principal difference between a conventional and a conversational implicature is that a conventional implicature is carried by the meanings of the words whereas a conversational implicature is not. This is a language criterion which can be defined as conventionality – correspondence of language units in discourse to conventional meaning established in dictionaries by convention.

When an implicature is not intended, it cannot be qualified as an implicature at all. This is a case of listener's inferences regarding speaker's speech behavior and interpreting his utterances. In discourse, these inferences take place when the shared knowledge of speaking partners is insufficient, which raises a check back response.

Such an approach suggests equating generalized implicatures to conventional ones. This contradicts the common view, but can be justified through empirical analysis, that we will show in Section III.

III. TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURES

The speaker embeds a conventional implicature into an utterance and the addressee derives it relying on semantics of language units. Such units are considered as triggers, since they activate an implicature in communicators' mind. We distinguish lexical, paroemiatic and syntactic implicatures according to the language type of trigger. This approach simplifies the classification of implicatures (see Figure 2).




Figure 2 Types of Implicatures

Types of conventional implicatures depend on the natural language, as they are tied to language units.

Lexical implicatures are tied to lexemes. In Ukrainian these are lexemes which have certain presuppositions in terms of semantics: verbs (*лікуватись, одягнутись, відкривати, закривати, розбудити*), particles (*і / теж, тільки, навіть*), pronouns (*усі, ніхто, дехто, один*), adverbs (*знову, зараз, поки що, завжди, далі, багато, вже*), adjectives (*минулий, майбутній, єдиний, кращий*) as well as nouns and noun phrases actualizing existential presuppositions in utterances, for example:

- *be on treatment* >> ‘*be ill*’;
- *wake up* >> ‘*the one who is sleeping*’;
- *also, too* >> ‘*referent is included into a known multitude*’;
- *only* >> ‘*referent is excluded from a known multitude*’;
- *everybody* >> ‘*each one from a known multitude carries a predicative attribute*’;
- *nobody* >> ‘*each one from a known multitude does not carry a predicative attribute*’;
- *again* >> ‘*not for the first time*’;
- *still* >> ‘*up to a certain moment*’;
- *her sister* >> ‘*she has a sister*’ etc.

These semes and presuppositions are activated in communicants' minds in discourse and trigger a corresponding implicature, that is why we call them lexical triggers of implicatures.

Let us illustrate how lexical implicatures are actualized on examples from Ukrainian discourse. Discourse excerpt (1) shows two lexical triggers – nominative phrase *її мама* (*her mother*) and verb *розбудили* (*woke ... up*):

(1) Конотоп. А чого вона з тобою не приїхала?

а. Діодоров. Я запрошував, але її мама не зносить машин. Каже, що в неї від газів голова обертом іде. (+> Мама Ольги теж приїжджає.)

Конотоп. А... а вона хіба... теж?

Діодоров. Приїжджає. Хоче свого майбутнього зятя, тобто вас, побачити.

<...>

Конотоп. Ясно. А потім?

Діодоров. Посадили мене перед телевізором, а самі пішли в іншу

б. кімнату... Через годину прийшли, розбудили мене і сказали, що приїдуть. (+> Я спав, тому нічого не чув і подробиць не знаю.)

Конотоп. Яким поїздом?

Діодоров. Не знаю. (Zarudnyy, 1971, pp. 567-568)

Konotop (a big boss) wants to marry Olha and sends his apprentice, Diodorov, for the lady. He comes alone and tells that Olha is coming later. Konotop inquires about details, and sluggish Diodorov feels his guilt for not keeping his promise and dreads his boss's fury, so he talks reluctantly and beats around the bush enclosing information into presuppositions. When the boss asks: “*Why hasn't she come with you?*” he answers: “*I invited her, but her mother can't stand cars. Says fumes make her dizzy*” (1a). Nominative phrase *її мама* (*her mother*) is a trigger that actualizes the implicature *Olha's mother is coming too*. Konotop derives the implicature, which is clear from his response: “*Oh... is she... too?*” “*She is*”, adds Diodorov and explicates the reason: “*[She] wants to see her future son-in-law, that is you*”. Such presuppositions are considered as existential presuppositions: when we name an object it is presupposed that the object exists (cf.: Meibauer, 2001, p. 46).

Konotop continues fishing out details, but Diodorov knows nothing for sure, because he was asleep and did not hear anything. While he is embarrassed to say it directly, he places the implicature into the verb *розбудити* (to wake up): “[They] put me in front of TV and went to another room, came back in an hour, woke me up and told me they were coming” (1b). *Мене розбудили* ([they] woke me up) implicates *я спав* (I was sleeping), which means that he did not hear anything and does not know any details.

Discourse excerpt (2) demonstrates actualization of implicature through trigger *ще поки* (still):

(2) *Кость. Мені наказ дав сам Шпичня, а він ще поки голова.* (+> *Його скоро знімуть.*)

Надійка. А чого поки, Костю, ти щось чув? (Zarudnyy, 1950, p. 28)

The speaker, willing to start a rumour that the chairman is about to be removed from post, uses a conventional meaning of a complex adverb *поки ще* (still) – ‘presence of action up to a certain point of time’: *I was ordered to by Shpytsya himself, and he is still the chairman* implicates *Shpytsya will soon be removed from his post*. The following question shows that the addressee has derived the implicature: “But why still, Kostya, have you heard something?”

Discourse excerpt (3) shows how particle *тільки* (adverb only) is used as a trigger:

(3) *Ремез. Ти любила мене. Я нічого не шкодував для тебе. Я знав тільки роботу, роботу і тебе.*

Мирослава. Ні, ти думав тільки про себе. (+> *Про мене ти не думав.*)

Ремез. Не бунтуй, Славко. А я теж людина. <...>

Давай забудемо все... (Zarudnyy, 1982a, p. 331)

In a quarrel, Remez accuses his wife of being cold, although he pulls out all the stops for her: “It was all about work. Work and you”. Myroslava objects: “No, you only thought about yourself”, which implicates *You didn’t think about me*. This implicature is produced through particle *тільки* (adverb only) based on its meaning – ‘distinguishing from a range of objects, people, phenomena’.

The phenomena described above acquire different statuses in studies: scalar implicatures, lexical presuppositions, existential presuppositions, conventional implicatures. However, they are united by the following: 1) they present implicit propositions, 2) they are tied to meanings of lexical units, thus, can be derived outside the context, 3) they can be intended in discourse. Being intended in discourse, they are implicatures. Since they are tied to lexical meanings, it is reasonable to consider them conventional.

Triggers of paroemiatic implicatures are paroemiatic utterances – predicative phraseological units: aphorisms, proverbs (4) and sayings (5). Meaning of implicature is assigned by meaning of paroemia as well as discursive context:

(4) *Ольга. Дмитро хороший. Найкращий.*

Світлана. Старої любові й іржа не їсть. Повір мені.

(+> *Ти його досі любиш.*)

Ольга. Ой, Світлано! (Zarudnyy, 1982c, p. 175)

Sisters are talking about Dmytro, Olha’s former sweetheart. Using the proverb *Старої любові й іржа не їсть* (Old love does not rust), Svytlana inserts the implicature *You still love him*. Referents of implicature are assigned by discursive context. As the context changes, referents will change too, but the meaning will remain the same.

When a saying is used, which is syntactically incomplete paroemia, the addressee usually appears as referent, as in excerpt (5b):

(5) *Кряж. Тоді без мене гуляйте. Я з ним <Дмитром> і на один поріг не стану.*

a. *Самопал. Отаке! Ворога знайшов.* (+> *Дмитро не ворог.*)

b. *Ех, Антоне, Антоне, не в тій ополонці рибу ловиш.* (+> *Не того ворогом вважаєш.*)

Кряж. То моє діло. (Zarudnyy, 1982c, p. 163)

Having found out that his rival is going to attend Samopal’s birthday celebration, Kryazh refuses to go. Samopal responds with the saying *не в тій ополонці ловити рибу* (to fish in a wrong ice hole): “You are fishing in a wrong hole”, inserting the implicature *You take a wrong man as rival* (5b).

The utterance (5a) demonstrates a syntactic implicature: through the phrase *take... as rival* the speaker conveys the implicature *Dmytro is not a rival*.

Syntactic implicatures are tied to syntactic construction – clauses, rhetorical, tautological and opposing structures. These structures present phrasal patterns (phrasal schemes) – predicative phrases or sentences which are coagulated in a fixed syntactic form and their lexical content varies. Fleischer (1997, p. 130) distinguishes phrasal patterns as such that do not fit into division of nominative and communicative phraseological units. They lie at the boundary between syntax and phraseology and are controversially designated as phraseological units.

The main feature of phrasal patterns is that these are not freely created structures. When filled with certain lexical content, these models become phrases where words receive the meaning determined by this model. Consequently, implicatures generated through such phrasal patterns in discourse are considered conventional.

Rhetorical questions come as phrasal patterns in question form, rhetorical affirmatives – in declarative form and rhetorical imperatives – in imperative form. Rhetorical affirmatives in Ukrainian discourse bear the form of phrasal patterns. *Знайшов ... (noun)* (5a); *Мені саме тепер до ...* (6a); *Можна подумати, що ...; Він / вона ... (verb)!*; *То ти / він що, ...?; Щось не бачив, щоб ...; От що значить ...!; Краще б спитав ... (clause); У тебе / вас ... (verb); Теж мені ... (noun); Це ж треба так ...!* etc. Speech acts with rhetorical affirmative often have ironic key which is marked by negative value and mockery illocution.

Discourse excerpt (6) includes a rhetorical affirmative (6a) and two rhetorical questions – (6b) and (6c):

(6) Васи́лина. *Завтра ми підемо на «Камінного господаря»?*

a. Цимбалюк. *Мені саме тепер до драматургії.*

(+> *Мені не до драматургії. +> Ми не підемо на «Камінного господаря».*)

b. *І взагалі, кому потрібна ця вигадка: камінний оживає і душить живого?* (+> *Нікому не потрібна. +> Мені не потрібна.*)

c. Васи́лина. *А хіба ж і досі камінні не душать живих?*

(+> *Камінні й досі душать живих. +> Бездушні люди й досі перемагають здатних на почуття. +> Ти бездушний.*)

Цимбалюк. *Це в якому аспекті?*

Васи́лина. *Звичайно, в міжнародному.*

Цимбалюк. *Ага. А я думав, ти знову під мене клинці підбиваєш.* (Stelmakh, 1973, p. 457)

Using a rhetorical affirmative (6a) Tsybalyuk refuses to go to the theater with his wife: “I’m just in the mood for drama”. The implicature *I am not in the mood for drama now* is a reason for refusal. Then he gives another reason: “Who needs this fiction: a stone host comes to life and strangles the living one?” (6b). Apart from the implicature *Nobody needs this fiction* this rhetorical question contains another implicature: *I don’t need this fiction*. They are talking about the play “The Stone Host” by Lesya Ukrainka.

His wife responds with another rhetorical question *Don’t stone people still strangle living ones?* (6c), generating a chain of implicatures: *Stone people still strangle living ones, Hollow people still overcome those capable of feelings and You are hollow*. The last implicature is conversational and metaphorical: *Living people are capable of feelings, stone people are hollow*; features of stone are projected on human features. This is the wife’s way of accusing her husband of insensitivity. The letter does not understand and asks back: “In what respect?” Vasylyna cancels the implicature coming off with a joke: “Global, of course”.

Typically, rhetoric questions in Ukrainian discourse are made through phrasal patterns *Кому потрібно ... (nomen)?* (6b); *Хіба ... ?* (6c); *(І) чого це ... ?* (9a); *Хіба можна ... ?*; *Невже треба ..., щоб... ?*; *(То) ... я (тобі) що, ... ?*; *... чи що / хто?*; *Щоб...?*; *Чи...?*; *Це...?*; *Чи ви всі думаєте, що ... ?*; *Ну може ..., чи ні?*; *Чи не здається тобі, що ... ?*; *Навіщо ... ?*; *Куди тобі ... ?*; *А що мені, ... (ininitiv)?*; *... (nomen) навіщо?*; *Що ти в ... (nomen) розумієш?*; *Як той ... (nomen) ... (adjective), то чого це він ... ?*; *І як це ви ... та ... ?*; *Який же то ... (nomen)?* And speech patterns *А чому (б) ні?*; *Яке це має значення?*; *А хто його знає?*; *Який же це?*; *Кому це потрібно?*; *А що я там не бачив?* etc.

They can be modified through expletives *так кажеш, може, (і) взагалі, думаєш, думав, по-твоєму*, pronouns *цей, то*, particles *же, ж, то, та, а, от, ось, вже, ну, там*.

Rhetorical questions are believed to involve reinterpretation of proposition from positive into negative and vice versa (cf.: Sadock, 1974, p. 125), i.e. a question in positive form expresses a negative statement (6b), and a negative question – a positive statement (6c). However, in alternative questions, no reinterpretation takes place and truth value of one of proposition actants belongs to speakers’ shared knowledge, so the addressee easily derives the implicature:

(7) Полі́на. *Посходяться, а Корній же не активу дзвонить, а до мене. Дружина я йому чи хто?* (+> *Дружина.*)

Терентій. *Для Корнія ти і актив – усе одно.* (Zarudnyy, 1976, p. 6)

Polina boasts that her husband always confirms with her, stressing with a rhetorical question that she is her wife: “Am I his wife or what?”

Aside from propositional reinterpretation, rhetorical questions draw illocutionary reinterpretation, when assertive speech acts are usually performed (6b). Those can include reproach expressive (6c) and boasting expressive (7). Rhetorical affirmatives perform assertive, expressive and refusal commissive (6a) speech acts.

Rhetorical imperatives come as phrasal patterns *Знайдіть / знайди хоч одного ..., який би ...!* (8c); *Скажіть, будь ласка, ... !*; *Тільки не кажи мені, що б я...;* *Ти ще скажи мені ... (infinitive);* *Давай, ... (imperative)*. In this case directive speech acts with ironical meaning and assertive speech acts are preformed:

(8) a. Васи́лина. *(Багатозначно). Ідіть уже, куме, до другого телевізора.*

(+> *Ідіть до своєї коханки.*)

Капуленко *(насторожено)*. *Це ж до якого другого?*

b. Васи́лина. *До того, де горілка і чари дешеві.* (+> *До своєї коханки.*)

c. Капуленко. *Ех, кумо, кумо... Знайдіть ось тут хоч одного чоловіка, що не обпікався б на жіночих чарах.* (+> *Немає чоловіка, що не обпікався б на жіночих чарах. +> Усі чоловіки мають коханок. +> Це нормально.*) *І що найтяжче: обпікаєшся, та не зарікаєшся.* (Stelmakh, 1973, p. 489)

This discourse excerpt presents two utterances with the same conversational implicature and one utterance is a rhetorical imperative. Vasylyna is trying to see Kapulenko off: “Just go to another TV, fellow!”. The letter does not understand the hint, so Vasylyna specifies: “To the one where vodka and charms are cheaper”, meaning the same implicature: *Go to your mistress*. Kapulenko derives the implicature, and assuming that Vasylyna could be judging him, makes excuses through a rhetorical imperative: “Find at least one man who hasn’t burnt himself on women’s charms!”.

inserting a chain of implicatures *There is no man who hasn't burnt himself on women's charms, All men have mistresses and Is is normal.*

Tautological utterances present phrasal patterns of declarative structure which argument and predicate of proposition formally match. Ukrainian tautological utterances have two types of phrasal patterns:

1) with repeated noun: N є N (*Життя є життя*); N – це N (*Театр – це театр*); N як N (*Дівчина як дівчина*); (Оце) N – так N (*Свято – так свято*); N був, N і зостався (*Харитон був, Харитоном і зостався*);

2) with repeated verb: V, так V (*Грати, так грати*); Що V, те й V (*Що буде, те й буде*); Що V, то V (*Що маємо, то маємо*).

In logic semantics, tautologies are considered meaningless, since their truth / falsehood is analyzed out of context (cf.: Lyons, 1979, p. 417). But in pragmatics the point of tautology lies in the implicature. In the next discourse excerpt, aside from a rhetorical question (9a) the speaker uses an utterance of tautological form (9b):

(9) а. Грибок. *І чого цей Сокіл причипився до Олексія Петровича?*

б. (+> *Нема причини чіплятися. Вони ж голова, як голова.* (+> *Він такий, яким повинен бути голова.*) *І поважні, і розумні...* (Zarudnyy, 1950, p. 23)

Using a rhetorical question, the speaker expresses perplexity about Sokil always criticizing the chairman: “*Why on earth is he picking at the chairman?*”, implicating that *There is no reason to pick at him*. The tautological utterance *Вони ж голова, як голова* (A chairman is a chairman) contains the implicature *He is what a chairman should be* which comes as argumentation for the previous utterance, thus expressing a positive value of the referent. In Ukrainian discourse the 3rd person plural pronoun referring to a person (non-addressee) is used to express respectful attitude.

The repeated unit may vary, but the meaning of the utterance implied in the implicature remains unchanged:

– *Голова, як голова.* +> *He is what a chairman should be;*

– *Дівчина, як дівчина.* +> *She is what a girl should be;*

– *Вікно, як вікно.* +> *It is what a window should be etc.*

The repeated unit refers to the referent, and the meaning is set by tautological form of utterance.

Ukrainian discourse is characterized by opposing structures which also are phrasal patterns, as their meaning is determined not only by opposing conjunction *a (but)*, but also ideomatization of structure: this is a compound sentence where the first contains a state of affairs and the second one – a proposition which agent is the addressee of utterance. The agent takes the form of 3rd person pronoun, and not 2nd person, as expected when referring to the addressee. Thus, the speaker reproaches the addressee for not carrying out the action determined in the first proposition and impels him to carry out the action:

– *The washing is soaking under rain, and she is reading a book! +> Instead of reading the book, take down the washing!*

– *The wife is being offended, and he's waiting for something to come! +> Don't wait, but defend your wife!*

The next discourse excerpt introduces a situation when mother, daughter and daughter-in-law are in the yard, and the phone is ringing in the home:

(10) *У хаті настирливо дзвонить телефон.*

Галина Софронівна. Чи ви поглигли, дівчата? Телефона чорного розриває, а вони стоять! (+> Не стійте, а підійть візьміть слухавку!) Може, Павло добивається.

Усі пішли до хати. (Zarudnyy, 1982a, p. 307)

Mother, listening to the phone's persistent ringing, becomes outraged: “*Have you gone deaf, girls? The black phone is ringing off the hook, and they are standing!*”, which implicates: *Don't just stand – go pick up the phone*. The speaker performs a directive speech act with an associated expressive illocution.

Among clauses which serve to convey implicature, object and conditional clauses are common. Object clauses are introduced through factive predicate (*know, regret, notice, be happy* etc.) which introduces factive presupposition, for example:

(11) *Майя. Чому він пішов з нею?*

Юля. А ти знаєш, що Галинка його любить? (+> Галинка його любить.)

Майя. Хай, хай любить! Мені все одно. (Zarudnyy, 1982b, p. 430)

To Maya's question why her ex-boyfriend went out with Halynka Yulya responds with an utterance in question form *Do you happen to know that Halynka loves him?* She performs an assertive speech act – communicates information built in factive presupposition which in this case bears the form of implicature: *Halynka loves him*. Thus, the factive predicate is used in so-called focused questions.

In case of conditional sentence, the base for derivation is a syntactic structure *Якби ..., то ...* (verbs in subjunctive mood) which is virtually a phrasal pattern, for example:

(12) *Світлана. Я теж його одягну, коли заміж буду виходити... На щастя... <...> Я хочу бути такою ж щасливою, як Оля.*

Наташа. Забобони.

Світлана. Пхі! А я одягну!

Наташа. Якби щастя від плаття залежало, то жодної нещасливої жінки не було б на світі. Плаття! (+> Щастя залежить не від плаття. +> На світі багато нещасливих жінок. +> Ольга теж нещаслива.)

Світлана. Колюча ти, Наташо! (Zarudnyy, 1982c, p. 124)

The sisters are examining elder sister Olha's wedding dress. The younger sister exclaims admiringly: "I'll wear it too when I'm getting married... for luck", considering Olha happy. The middle sister Natasha argues: "If happiness depended on the dress, there would be not a single unhappy woman on earth". Presupposition of this utterance comes as an implicature conveyed by Natasha: *Happiness doesn't depend on the dress. There are a lot of unhappy women in the world.* The final implicature in the chain is *Olha is unhappy*; however, this implicature is not conventional but conversational, because it is derived only based on discursive context.

Conditional clauses are considered as bearers of counterfactual presupposition (cf.: Meibauer, 2001, p. 48), although they fail the negation test which allows to determine if inference is a presupposition:

- Her mother can't stand cars. >> She has a mother.
- Her mother can stand cars. >> She has a mother.
- You know that Halynka loves him. >> Halynka loves him.
- You don't know that Halynka loves him. >> Halynka loves him.
- If happiness depended on the dress. >> Happiness doesn't depend on the dress.
- If happiness didn't depend on the dress. >> Happiness depends on the dress.

This test is relevant for logic semantics, but in discourse analysis it is completely unimportant if the inference of the utterance is its presupposition or not. What is important is on what grounds the implicature is derived.

Conversational implicatures are only derived based on discursive context, as it is shown in examples (8a) and (8b), as well as in the final implicature of chains (6c) and (12). Transparency degree of such implicatures is low, the addressee often turns to questions, as in excerpts (8a) and (6c). By contrast, conventional implicature relies on semantics of certain language units – triggers, which enables derivation of implicature outside the context. Nevertheless, only in discursive context it is possible to explicate an implicature, as it determines not only referents but also illocutionary features of implicature as well as possible implicature chains. Chains can combine conventional and conversational implicatures, but in such case the first implicature in the chain is conventional (6c).

As the above given examples show, implicatures are usually derived considering retrospective utterances as well as non-verbal means of communication.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

As can be seen from above, what is usually considered conventional implicature is in fact implicature only in discourse. Implicatures are inherently conversational because they are intended by the speaker and derived by the addressee in discourse. Therefore, it makes sense to regard conventional implicatures as such that are actualized not only in discursive context (such being the case with conversational implicatures), but by certain language means in virtue of their semantics. They serve as triggers allowing the addressee to derive implicature through its conventional meaning. Thus conventional implicatures appear more transparent than conversational ones.

Implicature triggers are culture-specific, since their semantics is determined by conventions of particular natural language. Depending on language status of the trigger, conventional implicature are divided into lexical, paroemiatic and syntactic. In discourse, implicatures can form chains. Further research is needed for mechanisms of implicature chains formation in discourse.

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Liliia Bezugla was born in Ukraine in 1963. She completed her MA in German Language in 1987 and her MA in English Language in 1992 at Kharkiv State University (now V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University), received her candidate degree (PhD) in Germanic Studies from the same university in 1998, and her doctoral degree (Doctor of Science) in Germanic Studies from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine in 2009.

She started her career as a schoolteacher in Kharkiv, from 1992 to 1999 she was a lecturer at the Department of Foreign Languages of Kharkiv Academy of Urban Economy, was promoted to Associate Professor at Kharkiv University at German Philology and Translation Department, was promoted to Professor in 2011 and currently is working at this position at the same university in Kharkiv, Ukraine. She has published about 200 articles in linguistics and translation. Her research interests are linguistic pragmatics, cognitive linguistics, discourse studies, linguistic poetics, translation studies, historical linguistics, and teaching German as a foreign language.

Prof. Bezugla is a member of Association of Ukrainian Germanists UGDV (Ukrainian branch of IDV).



Nataliia Govorukha was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine, in 1975. She completed her MA in German Language and Literature at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in 1997 and received her PhD in Germanic Languages (German) from the same University in 2014.

She started working as a lecturer at German Philology and Translation Department at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in 1997, was promoted to an Associate Professor in 2015 and currently is working at this position at the same university in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Her research interests are cognitive linguistics, text linguistics, pragmatics and discourse.

Dr. Govorukha is a member of Association of Ukrainian Germanists UGDV (Ukrainian branch of IDV).



Sergiy Kryvoruchko was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine, in 1977. He completed his MA in German Language and Literature at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in 2000 and received his PhD in Germanic Languages (German) from the same University in 2011.

He started working as a lecturer at the Department of German Philology and Translation at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in 2000, was promoted to an Associate Professor in 2014 and currently is working at the position of Head of the Department of German Philology and Translation at the same university in Kharkiv, Ukraine. His research interests are linguistic pragmatics, discourse studies, and teaching German as a foreign language.

Dr. Kryvoruchko is a member of Association of Ukrainian Germanists UGDV (Ukrainian branch of IDV).



Olesya Malaya was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine, in 1984. She completed her MA in German Language and Literature at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in 2005 and received her PhD in Germanic Languages (German) from the same University in 2009.

She started working as a lecturer at the Department of German Philology and Translation at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in 2007, was promoted to an Associate Professor in 2011 and currently is working at this position at the same university in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Since 2003 she is also working as a literary translator at the Publishing House "Family Leisure Club" in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Her research interests are linguistic pragmatics, internet linguistics and philosophy of language.

Dr. Malaya is a member of Association of Ukrainian Germanists UGDV (Ukrainian branch of IDV).