

Typology of Linguoconflictogenic Factors in Social and Political Communication of Kazakhstan

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Abstract—The paper examines linguoconflictogenic factors that influence the nature and dynamics of social and political communication in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Typical sources of linguistic conflicts are identified: asymmetry of language status, interpretive dissonances, symbolic violence, digital mechanisms of reproducing conflictual meanings. The aim is to identify and typologize linguoconflictogenic factors (LCF), to show their functioning in public discourse; the methodology combines critical discourse analysis, sociolinguistic diagnostics, and elements of conflictology, relying on a multi-source corpus of utterances from 2020–2025 (official speeches, parliamentary debates, mass media, Telegram/YouTube/Instagram) and five representative cases. The results show the multifactorial nature of LCF at the intersection of ethnolinguistic stratification, ideologization, historical-traumatic memory, digital reproduction, and normative fragmentation; a typology of six classes is proposed (normative, identity-related, ideological, digital-reproductive, legal-regulatory, historical-traumatic) and their features are described (provoking potential; explicitness/implicitness; social relevance; ideological load). The work clarifies the conceptual status of linguoconflictogenicity and offers a reproducible framework for analyzing and managing LCF in the conditions of Kazakhstan's multilingualism.

Index Terms—linguoconflictology, political discourse, language aggression, Kazakhstan, linguoconflictogens

I. INTRODUCTION

Modern Kazakhstani society is characterized by a high degree of sociocultural and linguistic diversity, which, on the one hand, represents a resource of interethnic stability, and on the other hand – a source of potential and actual communicative conflicts. In these conditions, language becomes not only a means of transmitting information, but also a marker of identity, political position, and cultural capital. Increasing sensitivity to linguistic behavior in the public sphere, the growing number of incidents related to the choice of language of communication, the stigmatization of language practices, and conflicts around language policy transform the very nature of social and political communication, making social and political communication potentially conflictogenic.

Particular significance is acquired by the study of *linguoconflictogenic factors* – speech, discursive and institutional elements that provoke tension, disagreements, and symbolic confrontation in the public space. Despite the presence of several studies in the field of verbal aggression, hate speech and discursive polarization, the problem of linguoconflictogenicity in the Kazakhstani context has not received proper conceptualization and typological description. Meanwhile, its relevance is determined by the need to develop tools for recognizing and managing linguistic risks both

in both the political and social spheres. In these conditions, the scientific understanding of the nature and types of linguoconflictogenic factors acquires particular importance not only for linguistics and conflictology, but also for applied tasks of public administration and information security.

The aim of this study is to identify, conceptually analyze, and typologize of linguoconflictogenic factors that influence the dynamics and structure of social and political communication in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The research tasks include:

1. To provide the theoretical and methodological justification of the concept of linguoconflictogenic factors, taking into account interdisciplinary approaches (linguistics, conflictology, political science, media communication).
2. To conduct a *discursive analysis of conflict-related speech situations* recorded in Kazakhstani public, political, and digital space in recent years.
3. To identify the main sources of linguoconflictogenicity, including: asymmetry of language status, symbolic violence, interpretive divergences, and media reproduction of conflictual narratives.
4. To develop and *substantiate a typology of linguoconflictogens* identified in the Kazakhstani context, taking into account their discursive nature and social functioning.
5. *To determine the interrelation between social and political linguoconflictogenicity* and to describe the mechanisms of their circulation and mutual reinforcement.
6. To formulate *practical recommendations* for the recognition and de-escalation of linguoconflict situations in governmental, educational, and media-communication structures.

In modern Kazakhstani society, issues of language turn out to be not only a matter of cultural self-identification, but also a source of persistent conflictual tensions. Linguistic conflicts increasingly become markers of deep sociocultural rifts, intensifying in situations of political mobilization, public polemics, and digital discourse. Language in such contexts ceases to be only a means of communication and turns into an instrument of symbolic violence, ethno-linguistic identification, and instrumentalization of public opinion.

The development of political and media rhetoric in Kazakhstan shows a shift of emphasis from an inclusive to a segregationist model of communication, where confrontational practices come to the fore, realized through linguistic mechanisms of stigmatization, discrediting, and mythologization of the “linguistic other.” At the same time, stable linguoconflictogenic zones are formed in the public space, where language becomes the core of political and social disputes.

In conditions of growing sociocultural sensitivity, linguistic diversity, and political polarization, language increasingly proves to be not just a means of communication, but also an arena of confrontations, symbolic struggle, and ideological pressure. Against this background, the study of *linguoconflictogenic factors*, that is, elements that contribute to the emergence, development, and institutionalization of conflicts mediated by language, acquires special relevance.

However, despite the active development of linguoconflictology as an interdisciplinary field, the concept of linguoconflictogenicity does not yet possess a stable conceptual status. This requires theoretical clarification, categorical ordering, and conceptual substantiation of this phenomenon.

The conceptual foundations of the notion “linguoconflictogenic factors” represent a complex derivative concept, that combines:

- *linguistic (linguistic) nature* – it is a matter of forms, means, strategies, ways of verbalization;
- *conflict potential* – hidden or explicit ability to provoke disagreements, tension, opposition;
- *factorality* – the causal and deterministic character of these units in the context of communicative interaction.

Thus, linguoconflictogenic factors are communicative or discursive elements that possess the ability to activate tension, provoke discord, shake the sociolinguistic balance, or disrupt the linguistic expectations of participants in communication.

They may manifest at different levels of the linguistic system and society:

- at the *lexico-semantic* level – abusive vocabulary, stigmatizing terms, labels;
- *pragmatic* – irony, ellipsis, provocative intonation;
- *discursive* – models of opposition, ideological dichotomization;
- *symbolic* – language as identity, power, and resource of belonging.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

In the international scholarly literature, language is considered not as a neutral conduit, but as a *strategic resource* capable of provoking, amplifying, or, on the contrary, de-escalating conflict through lexis, grammar, and discursive moves embedded in power relations. Studies of media discourse show how *conflictogenic units* – pejoratives, stigmatizing labels, and presuppositions – are selected and amplified, structuring the public salience of intergroup differences and normalizing antagonistic frames (Brusenskaya et al., 2022). Human rights and sociolinguistic literature indicate that the denial of access to language use and the reduction of its official guarantees exacerbate identity and intergroup conflicts, giving language the status of a symbol and a mechanism of political legitimation (Pupavac, 2006). At a broader theoretical level, research in systemic typology and sociolinguistics asserts that patterned linguistic choices reproduce social hierarchies and mobilize resistance (Danylenko, 2018), while language and cultural policy in polyethnic societies may inadvertently activate conflictogenic dynamics when perceived as hierarchical or exclusionary (Shalaev, 2015).

The analysis of scholarly literature in the post-Soviet space shows how linguistic landscapes, policy regimes, and educational systems serve as arenas where national identity and state legitimacy are constructed and contested. The linguistic landscape (signage, toponymy, and other forms of public visualization) materializes the dynamics of power relations in the urban environment and acts as an indicator of macropolitical transformations (Hasanova, 2021; McDermott, 2019; Pavlenko, 2009). Research in the field of language policy demonstrates that measures in education and status planning, declaring the goals of equality, can simultaneously reproduce mechanisms of exclusion: the institutional privileging of one code strengthens stratification and contributes to the polarization of communities (Brown, 2013; Pavlenko, 2003; Wigglesworth-Baker, 2016; Yedgina et al., 2023). Debates about the Russian language as a *lingua franca* remain central: for some it is a common communicative resource, for others – a legacy of domination with political cleavages related to its preservation or marginalization (Evdokimov et al., 2020; Fierman, 2012; Pavlenko, 2006; Zabrodskaja et al., 2021).

Empirical studies also connect language competence and work with identity to political outcomes – support for separatist projects, ethnic mobilization, or changes in self-identification – demonstrating the micro–macro link between practices in the classroom and on the street and geopolitical confrontation (Bilaniuk et al., 2008; Kulyk, 2011; Luscombe et al., 2014; Marquardt, 2017, 2021; Muth, 2014). Integrative approaches call for the combination of linguistic analysis with the theory of political mobilization in order to capture how policy, everyday practice, and symbolic visualization jointly produce the dynamics of conflict (Csernicsekó et al., 2017; Koteyko, 2014).

Approaching Kazakhstan, research focuses on reform trajectories, multilingual repertoires, and digital public spheres that shape conflictogenic potential in social and political communication. The alphabet reform and the revision of language status are interpreted as projects of symbolic rebalancing that can promote cohesion, but also provoke conflicts where inherited hierarchies and multidirectional identity projects intersect (Bekzhanova et al., 2022; Terlikbayeva et al., 2021; Yedgina et al., 2023). Sectoral studies show that the practice of trilingualism (Kazakh–Russian–English) functions as a coordinated resource distributing opportunities and power, revealing how workplace discourse can reflect broader socio-political stratification (Koptleuova et al., 2022). Among youth, the balance of native and foreign languages shapes linguistic identity and value orientations that find continuation in civic participation and expression of positions (Baimyrza et al., 2024; Smagulova, 2017). The digitalization of conflict has intensified these processes: public communicative discourse on platforms during the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine revealed language ideologies, “watchdog control,” and indexical regulation of the “correct” use of language, while real-time computational monitoring maps polarized frames (Kamalova, 2025; Karyukin et al., 2022).

The consolidation of domestic scholarly research in the field of legal linguistics and linguoconflictology further clarifies the mechanisms through which conflictogenicity enters the legal and political discourse of Kazakhstan. Basic analyses of disputed speech texts and forensic linguistic expertise set methodological foundations for identifying offensive meaning and defamatory statements in the course of judicial proceedings (Zhalmakhanov et al., 2013; Karymsakova et al., 2013; Tausogarova, 2006). Research on legal-linguistic monitoring and terminological accuracy asserts that improving the quality of legislative law-making and expert examination is key to minimizing ambiguities that catalyze conflicts in public communication (Akyzbekova, 2016; Primashev, 2015). The domestic body of research is complemented by sociolinguistic works on mass bilingualism in the north and status changes conditioned by policy, demonstrating how conflictogenic triggers materialize in specific legal texts, procedures, and evidentiary practice (Mongilyova, 2015).

Together with post-Soviet and international directions, these works map a multi-level ecosystem in which policy, practice, and legal expertise converge at the “language–conflict” nexus in Kazakhstan. Positioning previous research within this landscape, our 2025 study on the linguoconceptual nature of key intellectual parameters in Kazakhstani legal discourse – such concepts as *qūyq* (law), *qorǵau* (protection), *ādildik* (justice), and *teñdik* (equality) – adds a cognitive-semantic layer to the agenda of conflictogenicity, showing how the conceptual structure of legal lexis influences interpretation, law-making, and expert evaluation (Bakytzhanova et al., 2025).

Thus, the presented review outlines the field where language functions as a tool of socio-political construction and a source of conflictogenicity, however, methodological lacunae remain in it: it is insufficiently shown how cognitive structures of basic legal concepts and their terminological specification are included in the escalation/de-escalation of disputes in different genres (law-making, law enforcement, media, social networks); indicators of risk comparable to procedures of legal-linguistic expertise are weakly operationalized; the effects of bilingualism, status planning, and digital visualization are considered in a fragmented way.

III. MATERIAL AND METHODS

The study used a multi-source corpus of public discourse over the past 5 years (2020–2025), including official political speeches, parliamentary debates, media reports, public statements, and user comments on social networks (Telegram, YouTube, Instagram), as well as materials from news platforms. Selection was carried out according to two criteria: thematic relevance to language conflicts and public resonance (substantial discussion/coverage in the media). For detailed analysis, five representative cases were chosen, reflecting different triggers: *Ye. Taychibekov* (interview on “Russophobia”), *K. Akhmetov*’s “language patrols,” *R. Mukhorapov*’s comment on language etiquette, the *TikTok incident* (insult to the Kazakh language), *S. Cherchesov*’s remarks at a press conference.

The methodology of the study is integrative in *nature and combines critical discourse analysis, a sociolinguistic approach, and conflict theory*. Critical discourse analysis was used to identify how language choices reflect power relations, ideologies, and the construction of identity. Each text was coded according to conflict-linguistic factors in several dimensions: *normative* (correctness of language and etiquette), *identity-related* (language as a marker of group belonging), *ideological* (language correlated with political positions), *digital-reproductive* (viral spread of conflict through memes and social networks), *legal-regulatory* (appeal to laws or policy), and *historical-traumatic* (references to past linguistic injustices). Coding was carried out on the basis of a scheme developed inductively with reliance on previous literature and pilot coding sessions. Coding reliability was ensured through independent double coding and discussion of discrepancies. The analysis of the five cases made it possible to conduct both within-case and cross-case comparisons, identifying how different triggers interact with each other and how language conflicts cut across social and political spheres.

All materials are from open sources; personal identifiers of non-public individuals were removed. Internal validity was enhanced by source triangulation (*official transcripts, media, user content*) and iterative refinement of the codebook; intercoder agreement was calculated and discussed until acceptable consistency was achieved. The methodological framework and *coding protocol* are described in such a way that they can be reproduced and applied to other contexts where language functions as a conflict trigger; at the same time, in this work the conclusions are limited to the analysis of five cases from 2020–2025, which is reflected in the discussion section as a limitation of generalizability.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The study of linguoconflictogenic factors showed that these phenomena do not exist in isolation, but are inscribed into the system of social relations and cultural codes. Their origin is connected with a multifactorial logic in which are combined *ethnolinguistic stratification* (unequal access to prestigious languages), *ideological polarization* (language as a political marker), *cultural-historical traumaticity* (memory of linguistic discrimination), *media reproduction* (mass replication of conflictual meanings in the digital environment), and *normative fragmentation* (divergence of official policy and actual language practice). Taken together, these factors reinforce the conflictogenic potential of public communication. This multifactoriality was clearly manifested in all five resonant episodes of 2020–2025: the *ideological frame and traumatic memory* in the statements of Ye. Taychibekov; *identity opposition and digital mediatization* in K. Akhmetov's "language patrols"; the *normative-etiquette collision* in the statement of R. Mukhorapov; *digital virality and law enforcement* in the TikTok incident with E. Lyu; the *social-normative expectation of respect for the state language* in the public remarks of S. Cherchesov.

For a more precise understanding of linguoconflictogenicity, its distinctive features were identified. These characteristics are presented in *Table 1*.

TABLE 1
FEATURES OF LINGUOCONFLICTOGENIC FACTORS

Feature	Characteristic
<i>Provoking potential</i>	to cause a reaction of aggression, rejection, or defense among participants of communication
<i>Intentionality or latency</i>	to manifest consciously (direct verbal attack) or unconsciously (violation of expectations)
<i>Social relevance</i>	to acquire significance only in a certain sociocultural context
<i>Speech explicitness / discursive implicitness</i>	to be expressed explicitly (insult) or through frames, metaphors, allusions
<i>Ideological load</i>	to participate in the formation of oppositional meanings and identities

The *provoking potential* is most evident in the TikTok incident of 2023 (E. Lyu): the explicit insult of the language and its speakers instantly provoked a mass defensive reaction and legal evaluation. *Intentionality/latency* was ambiguously manifested in the case of R. Mukhorapov: one part of the audience read in his words an intentional devaluation of a cultural norm, the other – an indication of latent rudeness of the addressee's behavior; perceptual asymmetry launched polarization. *Social relevance* amplified the resonance of S. Cherchesov's remarks: in an everyday context they could have passed unnoticed, but in the public field of sports – a domain of national symbols – they acquired conflictogenic status. *Ideological load and implicitness* structured the interview of Ye. Taychibekov: the rhetoric of the "Russian world" turned language into an indicator of political loyalty. *Explicitness + mediatization* converted the "spot" episodes of language patrols, in the perception of the audience, into a nationwide dispute.

An important concept in the analysis of conflict communication is *linguistic risk* – the probability of the emergence of conflict due to the violation of linguistic norms and expectations. Linguoconflictogenic factors act as markers of such risk, since they: (1) disrupt the balance of expectations between interlocutors, (2) create perceptual asymmetry (different interpretations of one utterance), (3) provoke responsive aggression or emotional mobilization. Work with these factors is simultaneously work on reducing linguistic risks in the public sphere, especially in governmental and digital communications. Empirically, a "short chain of risk" is recorded: local deviation from expectations → digital replication → ideologization/norm framing → institutional response; it is reproduced in the cases of the patrols (from "street" pressure to regulatory discussion) and the TikTok incident (from direct insult to initiation of legal proceedings).

The specificity of the Kazakhstani context is manifested in the fact that language here is not only a means of communication, but also an element of the national project and a symbol of modernization. This gives linguoconflictogenic factors particular force. Characteristic manifestations are conflicts around the status of Kazakh and Russian languages, aggression towards “those not speaking Kazakh,” imposition of a certain linguistic identity as a sign of patriotism, and disputes about the admissibility of Russian in official communication. Linguoconflictogenicity in such cases is an indicator of social tension, ideological fragmentation, and institutional challenges. Understanding these processes requires an interdisciplinary approach that takes into account the *affective-identificational* function of language, that is, its ability not only to transmit information but also to form identity and emotions. Taken together, the cases show that language in the Republic of Kazakhstan is simultaneously *symbolic capital, a resource of legitimation, and a field of struggle for interpretative rights*.

The theoretical-methodological foundation of the study was provided by critical discourse analysis, linguistic-cultural conflictology, pragmalinguistics, and speech act theory. These methods make it possible to consider communication as a multi-level process, where language performs both informative and affective-identificational functions, generating and sustaining social tensions. CDA reveals the binary opposition of “*us/them*” in the patrols and ideological indexicalization in the interview of Taychibekov; pragmalinguistics diagnoses the breakdown of cooperativity/politeness in the episodes of Mukhorapov–Cherchesov; speech act theory qualifies the livestreamed expressive acts of E. Lyu as speech acts with high insulting force and public performativity.

At the socio-political level, important contexts of linguistic conflicts were identified. First, the asymmetry of the linguistic space: although Kazakhstan is officially bilingual, the actual distribution of languages generates latent tension. Second, symbolic violence and discursive inequality. The mechanisms described by P. Bourdieu are manifested in the establishment of a dominant discourse, where alternative language positions are stigmatized (for example, a public speech in Russian may be perceived as ideological dissent). Third, linguistic profanation and memetization: the media space actively produces labels and aggressive memes, forming stereotypes about the “*linguistic other*” and intensifying conflicts. The stitching of these contexts is especially evident in the “language patrols”: latent asymmetry → demonstrative “equalization” through coercion; symbolic violence → public humiliation and demand for apologies; memetization → viral videos and comments as amplifiers of conflict.

On the basis of the analysis of Kazakhstani digital and media platforms (*Telegram, YouTube, comment feeds*), the following typology of linguoconflictogenic factors was developed, presented in *Table 2*.

TABLE 2
TYPES OF LINGUOCONFLICTOGENIC FACTORS

Type of linguoconflictogen	Characteristic	Example (Kazakhstan)
<i>Normative</i>	Appeal to language standards; condemnation of violations	Accusations of “illiteracy,” use of the term “russism”
<i>Identity-related</i>	Opposition of “own” and “alien” by language	Construction of the image of a “Russian-speaking colonial stratum”
<i>Ideological</i>	Interpretation of language as a marker of political position	Slogans about “true patriots,” equating language with patriotism
<i>Digital-reproductive</i>	Replication of conflicts in memes, videos, comments	YouTube debates on the language law, viral videos
<i>Legal-regulatory</i>	Use of legal norms as an argument	Discussion of the law on the state language, requirements for duplicating signage
<i>Historical-traumatic</i>	Appeal to collective memory of discrimination	The theme of Russification, loss of native language

The *normative* type arises when public or official language standards are violated. Under the conditions of active Kazakhization, sensitivity to mistakes and borrowings increased; metalinguistic criticism (“does not know Kazakh,” “russism”) turns language into an instrument of pressure. The *identity-related* type is especially sensitive to the ethnopolitical divisions of society: language marks a symbolic boundary between “us” and “them,” and public statements about “ethnolinguistic superiority” intensify marginalization. *Ideological conflictogens* emerge when language is interpreted as an indicator of political position: knowledge of Kazakh equals patriotism, while Russian-speaking equals betrayal or orientation toward other values. The *digital-reproductive* type is connected with media technologies and memetization: short emotional utterances and visual stereotypes are massively replicated, normalizing aggressive speech patterns. The *legal-regulatory* type becomes relevant when language policy acquires an instrumental-coercive character, provoking mobilization on both sides. The *historical-traumatic* type appeals to collective memory of Russification and language loss, which sharpens intergroup relations and revives historical accusations.

Case projection of the typology: “patrols” – *identity-related* + *normative* (+ *digital*); Mukhorapov – *normative* (+ *digital*); Cherchesov – *normative* (+ *identity-related*); Taychibekov – *ideological* (+ *historical-traumatic*); TikTok – *digital* (+ *legal-regulatory* and *identity-related*).

In light of Tables 1–2 and the designated typology, specific empirical episodes of 2020–2025 reveal the mechanisms of the emergence and escalation of conflicts. Thus, the interview of Taychibekov (2020) illustrates how an *ideological frame* (“Russian world”) implicitly reinterprets language as a symbol of loyalty: expressives about “Russophobia” cast a shadow of suspicion on any practices of promoting Kazakh, transferring them into the political register of “infringement.”

The provoking potential here is high not due to lexical rudeness, but because of *ideological load*: the audience reads the statement as an attempt at symbolic revision of sovereign language policy. As a result, the factors of Table 1 (“social relevance” and “ideological load”), together with media reproduction, amplify polarization and lead to legal evaluation – already the domain of Table 2 (*legal-regulatory contour*).

Akhmetov’s (2021) “language patrols” demonstrate identity mobilization through performatives of public coercion: the demand to switch the language of service, recording apologies on video, labeling practices as “correct/incorrect.” Here three features of Table 1 converge at once: *explicitness* (scenes on camera), *intentionality* (targeted raids), and *provoking potential* (shame-shaming). *Digital mediatization* (Table 2, “digital-reproductive”) multiplies visibility and turns a local episode into a national debate on norms. Institutional reaction (condemnatory statements, criminal prosecution of the organizer, subsequent emphasis on duplicating signage in Kazakh as normative protection without discrimination) demonstrates the transition from spontaneous norm to formal regulation (see intersections in Table 3) and indicates the limits of admissibility for practices of “forced Kazakhization” in the legal field.

The episode with Mukhorapov (2022) is an indicator of a *normative conflict of expectations*: what counts as politeness in a bilingual situation? In the businessman’s speech act, the key trigger was an evaluative presupposition (“not from great culture”), which the Kazakh-speaking audience read as a devaluation of the symbolic value of responding in the state language. Here *latency* and *intentionality* (Table 1) split into different reader positions, producing perceptual asymmetry. The digital environment amplified the conflict into a national discussion, but the legal contour was not activated – instead, the political contour of de-escalation worked (the president’s call not to politicize the language issue), which illustrates the transition in Table 3 from a social normative collision to a political framework of settlement without sanctions.

The TikTok incident with Lyu (2023) is an example of *pure explicit aggression* (Table 1: explicitness, provoking potential), accelerated by *digital mediatization* (Table 2: digital-reproductive), transitioning into the *legal-regulatory* plane (initiation of a case and sentence). It is especially significant that the *identity factor* manifested instantly: the insult to the language was read as an insult to the nation. This case demonstrates a low threshold of tolerance for public devaluation of the state language and high social consensus of expectations in Table 1 (“*social relevance*” and “*ideological load*” in connection with the symbolic nature of language), and also clearly confirms the usefulness of *preventive monitoring* (Table 4) for early suppression of such outbreaks.

The situation with Cheresov (2024) reveals the *social-normative standard* of public respect for the state language in official communication. The ironic counter-questions of the coach (“in Ossetian?,” “in French?”) from the perspective of pragmatics are read as *face-threatening acts*, which in the public field of sports – symbolically charged – acquire high *social relevance* (Table 1). Institutional reaction (public reprimand, ethical sanctions) confirms that even outside the political field a normative consensus on respect for the status of the language operates; at the same time, the case illustrates the transfer of the *social into the political* (Table 3), when etiquette becomes the subject of public image policy.

The proposed typology demonstrates that linguoconflictogenic factors in Kazakhstan go beyond grammar and etiquette: they represent discursive regimes in which language simultaneously acts as a *resource*, *instrument*, and *arena of political action*. Conflictogenicity intensifies during sociocultural transformations, when the boundaries of the “language norm” and symbolic belonging are reinterpreted. The typology remains open for expansion: one can identify, for example, *gender-linguistic* or *urbanization-linguistic* subtypes, taking into account discrimination by gender and territorial affiliation. Case data provide empirical markers of such subtypes: stigmatization of “aul people” in TikTok – the line of urbanization-linguistic discrimination; pressure on female vendors in the patrols – a potential gender contour of vulnerability.

The analysis of the interaction of linguoconflictogens at the social and political levels shows that the boundaries between them are increasingly blurred. Conflicts that arose as social incidents (for example, comments in messengers or a conflict in the service sphere) quickly receive political publicity in the digital environment, and then grow into political debates and legislative initiatives. And conversely, political narratives (“national unity through language,” “historical retribution”) are embedded into everyday communication, legitimizing the demand for “linguistic purity” and stigmatization of bilinguals. The patrols and Cheresov cases demonstrate the trajectory “*social* → *political*,” while Taychibekov – “*political* → *social*”; the TikTok incident – “*digital* → *legal*.” This circulation confirms the intersections of Table 3 and explains the persistence of tension.

The interrelation between types of linguoconflictogens in social and political communication is presented in *Table 3*.

TABLE 3
CROSS-TYPES OF LINGUOCONFLICTOGENS

Type of conflictogen	In social communication	In political communication
<i>Normative</i>	Condemnation of “incorrect” speech, codification	Legislative initiatives, language regulations
<i>Identity-related</i>	Opposition of “us” and “them”	Nationalist rhetoric, “us-versus” mobilization
<i>Digital-reproductive</i>	Memes, viral videos, TikTok debates	Media instruments of shaping electoral images
<i>Historical-traumatic</i>	Narratives about loss of language, Russification	Political mythologization, references to postcolonialism
<i>Ideological</i>	Language as a marker of one’s own position	Formation of images of “patriot/traitor” in public politics

Such an analysis shows a high degree of functional convergence of factors: language simultaneously performs communicative, identificational, and politico-symbolic functions. The transfer of conflictogenic speech acts from one level to another leads to *institutionalization of spontaneous norms*, reinforcement of *normative paradoxes* (when the same behavior turns out to be admissible in some contexts and condemned in others), growth of *latent tension* in the digital environment, and blurring of boundaries between private speech and public responsibility. Examples of the “*norm paradox*”: an answer in Kazakh as simultaneously “a natural choice” and “impoliteness” (debates around Mukhorapov’s phrase); public performative “defense of the language” as “civic activism” and as “discriminatory coercion” (patrols).

The complexity of these processes requires an *interdisciplinary approach* to the analysis and management of linguoconflicts. Such an approach integrates the tools of linguistics, political science, sociology, jurisprudence, conflictology, and communication psychology. It allows for a deeper understanding of the nature of speech confrontations and the development of strategies for their prevention, de-escalation, and institutional response. In projection onto the cases, this means: (a) *digital monitoring* for early suppression of escalations (TikTok, “patrols”); (b) *mediation of etiquette collisions* (Mukhorapov, Cherchesov) through public clarification of norms; (c) *legal certainty* of the boundaries of inadmissibility (Lyu case) without “over-criminalization” of borderline cases; (d) *depoliticization of historical-ideological labels* (Taychibekov) through counter-frames that replace the dichotomy “us/them” with models of cooperation.

It is important to take into account different levels of analysis, as shown in *Table 4*.

TABLE 4
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS OF LINGUOCONFLICTS AND CORRESPONDING METHODS

Level of analysis	Main focus	Tools and methods
<i>Linguistic</i>	Speech structure, markers of aggression	Pragmatics, discourse analysis
<i>Social</i>	Status roles, norms, expectations	Sociolinguistic diagnostics, interviews
<i>Psychological</i>	Perception, emotional reaction	Content analysis, psycholinguistic modeling
<i>Political</i>	Ideologization, mobilization potential	Political discourse analysis
<i>Legal</i>	Violation of rights, norms, regulations	Legal expertise, legal analysis

On the basis of these disciplines, several principles of managing linguoconflicts are distinguished:

1. *Preventiveness and monitoring* – early detection of conflictogenic trends through social media analysis and expert methodologies;
2. *Contextuality of response* – consideration of cultural, regional, and ethnopsychological features in institutional intervention;
3. *Semiotic neutralization* – development of counter-narratives and speech strategies that neutralize dangerous symbolic constructions;
4. *Inclusive language policy* – support of multilingual and multilayered communication;
5. *Interdepartmental cooperation* – involvement of mass media, NGOs, and justice bodies;
6. *Ethical and legal regulation* – development of standards of public speech behavior and responsibility for linguistic discrimination.

Applied to the five cases: (1) tracking viral markers (lexemes/memes) and their sprouts – in order to prevent “*spontaneous ignition*” of discourse; (2) public clarification of etiquette norms of bilingualism – to reduce the “*parallax of politeness*”; (3) precise demarcation of *hate speech vs. sharp criticism* – for stable law-enforcement practices; (4) support of frames of “*common citizenship*” against the binaries of “patriot/traitor”; (5) ethical codes for public figures regarding the state language – in order not to reproduce scenarios like Cherchesov’s.

The application of these principles is especially relevant for Kazakhstan, where language is simultaneously an identificational resource and an instrument of struggle for recognition and resources. Effective conflict management requires a *balance between normativity and tolerance*, protection of language as a symbol of identity and prevention of discrimination, preservation of institutional trust and avoidance of segregation. The model of interdisciplinary management developed in the study can become the basis of a *national strategy of linguoconflictological security*, aimed at prevention, diagnosis, and resolution of speech crises in the public sphere.

In the end, linguoconflictogenic factors in Kazakhstan are not just violations of language etiquette, but complex markers of social and political processes, requiring deep analysis and careful management. Summarizing the empirical material of 2020–2025, it can be concluded: sustainable reduction of linguistic risk is achieved through synchronous work along *four contours* – *etiquette norms, digital media environment, ideological frames, legal certainty of enforcement* – with mandatory consideration of the specifics of Kazakhstani multilingualism.

Brusenskaya et al. (2022) show that media amplify conflictogenic units and accelerate the transition to escalation; in our cases of the TikTok incident and the “language patrols,” this logic is confirmed by the “*short chain of risk*” (local deviation of expectations → digital replication → ideologization → institutional response). Pupavac (2006) links the contestation of language rights with the growth of intergroup tension; comparison of materials on the statements of R. Mukhorapov and public remarks of S. Cherchesov demonstrates precisely such a mechanism, when divergence of expectations concerning the status of the state language and of the “language of politeness” turns into stable foci of

conflictogenicity. Pavlenko (2009) emphasizes that linguistic landscapes and public registers serve as arenas of struggle for belonging and power; our observations on the “patrols” and public appeals confirm that the marking of “correct/incorrect” language practice quickly receives political publicity and becomes normalized in online practices. Yedgina et al. (2023) describe the balance of Kazakhstani language policy between institutional strengthening of Kazakh and maintaining functional multilingualism; enforcement and ethical responses in our cases (including initiation of legal cases and public sanctions) correspond to the trajectory of such “*soft institutionalization*”.

Pavlenko (2009) also notes the transformation of language choice into political indexicalization; the interview of Ye. Taychibekov replicates this effect, when language is read as a marker of loyalty, and the reference to “Russophobia” transfers the discussion into the field of political confrontation. Brusenskaya et al. (2022) record the role of visual-verbal shaming practices in the digital sphere; in the “language patrols” the video recording of apologies and the verification of “correctness” of practices confirm media reproduction of conflictogens. Pupavac (2006) underlines the significance of “*linguistic expectations*”; in the case of R. Mukhorapov, perceptual asymmetry in reading a single phrase launches a normative conflict, whereas the case of S. Cherchesov reveals public consensus on respecting the status of the state language in symbolically charged domains. Finally, the shift described by Yedgina et al. (2023) towards predictable frameworks of public address to language correlates with our observations on the regulatory definiteness of thresholds of inadmissibility: digital explicit aggression leads to a rapid transition into the legal-regulatory sphere, while etiquette collisions lead to public de-escalation strategies.

The practical implications of the study affect three groups of stakeholders. For *government authorities*, the results provide a basis for fine-tuning language policy: (a) preventive monitoring of digital triggers and conflictogenic markers; (b) public explanations of the “etiquette of bilingualism” in service and official communications; (c) maintenance of clear legal boundaries between “sharp criticism” and “hate speech” with predictable sanctions. For *media, sports, business, and education*, ethical codes of public speech behavior, mediation scenarios, and procedures of “rapid cooling” of reputational crises are necessary (the Mukhorapov/Cherchesov cases show the vulnerability of public figures to “*paralysis of the norm*”). For the *expert community and NGOs*, the proposed typology and the matrix of levels (Tables 1–4) can serve as an instrumentarium for rapid diagnosis of linguistic risk (*risk scoring*), selection of counter-narrative strategies, and assessment of the effectiveness of interventions (for example, when ethical persuasion is more appropriate, and when legal reaction is required). Overall, the integration of our findings into communication regulations reduces the likelihood of escalation and the costs of conflicts, enhancing the resilience of the multilingual public sphere.

Future research should be directed at deepening the measurement and comparative aspects. First, it is necessary to develop quantitative metrics of linguoconflictogenicity (*index of provoking potential, scale of perceptual asymmetry*) and validate them on longitudinal corpora of social networks, mass media, and transcripts of public events. Second, causal mapping of transitions between our types (e.g., “normative → ideological”), including experiments with framing and behavioral studies of the perception of the “*etiquette of bilingualism*,” is promising. Third, it is important to expand the comparative horizon: to compare Kazakhstani data with other multilingual post-Soviet contexts in order to distinguish the unique effects of national policy from general regional regularities (at the intersection of the conclusions of Pavlenko, 2009; Pupavac, 2006). Fourth, it is worth connecting legal linguistics and applied conflictology: to test which formulations of norms and explanations more effectively reduce risk (*A/B designs, field experiments in service institutions*). Finally, it is necessary to develop open early-warning models for government agencies and media platforms (*alert-systems on conflictogenic markers*) and to describe best practices of “*soft de-escalation*” without excessive criminalization of borderline cases.

V. CONCLUSION

This study showed that linguoconflictogenicity in social and political communication of Kazakhstan has a strictly multifactorial nature and manifests itself at the intersection of *ethnolinguistic stratification, ideological polarization, cultural-historical traumaticity, media reproduction, and normative fragmentation*. The features of conflictogens proposed by us (*provoking potential; intentionality/latency; social relevance; explicitness/implicitness; ideological load*) and the typological framework (*normative, identity-related, ideological, digital-reproductive, legal-regulatory, historical-traumatic*) proved their analytical validity on the material of five resonant cases of 2020–2025 and data from digital platforms. The linkage of tables (Tables 1–4) ensured the transition from qualitative description to operationalized assessments: from recording features → to attributing cases to types → to modeling the cross-influence of social and political levels → and to selecting relevant managerial instruments. Thus, the article takes the analysis beyond the framework of “*incident description*” to an explanatory model that captures the *short chain of risk*: local deviation from expectations → digital replication → ideologization → institutional response.

The practical effect of the work consists in the proposal of an institutionally implementable management framework: (a) preventive monitoring of digital triggers and conflictogenic markers; (b) standards of the “*etiquette of bilingualism*” for public and service interactions; (c) differentiated reaction – from counter-narratives and public apologies to ethical sanctions and legal measures; (d) interdepartmental coordination and training of high-profile speakers. The results obtained are relevant for developers of language policy, regulators, editorial offices and PR-units, educational bodies and NGOs, as well as for platforms interested in reducing the conflictogenicity of user content. The perspective of further work is quantitative validation of indices of linguoconflictogenicity and the construction of early-warning systems on

large data sets, which will make it possible to transform the model we have identified from diagnostic to prognostic, enhancing the resilience of the multilingual public sphere and the quality of democratic dialogue.

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